By all predictions, the United States Army will continue to be involved in some form of persistent conflict or engagement for at least the next decade. In order to meet expanding mission requirements, the Army, and consequently, the Army chaplaincy, is likewise expected to continue to grow in officer allocations. In the active component an increase of almost 25% in just ten years, with most of the growth at the Captain and Major levels.
However, chaplain accessioning and retention efforts have not, in recent history, kept up with the growth of the Chaplaincy allocations. The gap between allocations and on hand strength is compounded not only by force structure growth, but also by the annual attrition of chaplains who leave active duty due to retirement, resignation, interservice transfer, administrative discharge, medical release, or death.
Simply put, for the last eleven years, there have typically been more chaplain allocations ("spaces") than chaplains in the inventory ("faces") to fill those spaces. 15 In the current era of persistent engagement, it is no simple matter for each assigned UMT to accomplish the myriad tasks subsumed under the three major religious support functions of nurturing the living, caring for the dying, and honoring the dead 16 within its own organic unit of anywhere from 300 to 1000+ Soldiers, let alone taking on the additional burden of attempting to provide the same level of support for units of equal size that are short of chaplains. 17 One apparent solution which has been suggested for addressing similar shortages of chaplains in times past is to change the policy of assigning chaplains to units, and instead place them in chaplain "pools," from which they could be dispatched to units "as required." This model was extant during the Viet Nam era, and the persistent lack of religious support for troops in combat formations was one of the primary rationales for implementing the current practice of embedding UMTs in units. A key factor that the CCH must keep in mind when attempting to accomplish this mission is that officer personnel management (chaplain officers included) is best viewed as a system. Several Joint and Army publications define a system as "a functionally, physically and/or behaviorally related group of regularly interacting or interdependent elements that form a unified whole." 18 As with any true system, because of the interrelatedness of its parts, it is not possible to ever just change one, single part of the Chaplain Corps' personnel management system without that change having an effect on some other part of the system. As sociologist Robert Jervis says, "In a system we can never merely do one thing." 19 A solution that seems to perfectly solve one isolated problem in a system can easily create new problems in another part of that system; thus, any potential solution's benefits needs to be balanced with the potentially negative effects it will have on system as a whole. A systems approach, therefore, is absolutely essential to Army chaplain personnel management, so that the CCH and his appointed personnel experts can see the potential effects each policy decision will have on all aspects of individual officers' careers, the various demographic groupings of chaplains (denominational affiliation, vocational specialty, rank), and the health and future viability of the Branch as a whole.
From an ends, ways, and means perspective, the end or objective that the Army's Chaplaincy Officer Personnel Management System hopes to meet is that all Soldiers and Family members have a fully-qualified chaplain to whom they can turn for religious support.
Following is a suggestion of some of the personnel management tools (means) available to the Chief of Chaplains and some projections for how those means can be used (ways) to maintain the number of on-hand chaplains at or near the number of allocations. As each ways and means is considered, the possible second and third order effects of its implementation on the overall system of chaplain personnel management are also presented. One accession standard where exceptions can be made is maximum age. The current maximum acceptable age for fully qualified applicants with no prior military experience is 42 years. 21 To increase the number of applicants who are qualified for active duty, the CCH could waive the maximum age standard within certain limits of the law, so that those who would have been otherwise disqualified because they were too old are now eligible to serve. For many ministers, the older they are, the more experience they have had in providing ministry. This experience could certainly be viewed as a plus when dealing with the many, complex religious support needs of today's Soldiers and Families.
However, if the CCH continued to modify accession age standards to allow ministers of increasing age to serve, another problem could result. Newly accessioned chaplains serving their first two or three tours of active duty are usually assigned to battalion-level units, where physical fitness expectations are often at their highest.
While some exceptions certainly exist, it is true for most adults that physical conditioning, flexibility, and energy levels tend to decrease with age. Thus, relaxing the maximum age standard could cause not only adjustment issues for older chaplains attempting to assimilate to Army life, but could even result in those chaplains being given officer evaluation ratings (OERs) below that of their younger peer captains (nonchaplains) for failing to maintain as high a physical conditioning standard or for failing to display as youthful a vitality as their peers. Either consequence could then cause higher attrition, which would only serve to worsen the shortage problem.
Another accessioning standard that the CCH can adjust in order to receive greater numbers of clergy applicants is professional work experience (PWE). The Army
Chaplaincy currently requires a minimum of two years PWE which must be validated by the applicant's faith group as legitimate pastoral ministry work prior to becoming an active duty chaplain. 22 By reducing the PWE time to eighteen months or one year, the CCH could potentially reap a number of clergypersons who were otherwise qualified, but simply lacked the required minimum experience. The 24-month requirement could then be reinstated once the force is stabilized.
The question for the Army Chaplaincy then becomes whether it is preferable to accept the risks associated with less experienced Chaplains or conversely, to take the risks involved when units must temporarily be without the direct support of an assigned chaplain. The high stresses today's Soldier faces, including frequent exposure to danger, carnage, and death; multiple separations from loved ones; and long-term deprivations from creature comforts are well known and well documented. Such stressors demand that the Army bring in and keep Chaplains whose experience equips them to provide spiritual coping skills for Soldiers at all levels of distress, give sage advice to Commanders and other leaders, and offer a wide variety of religious support venues in even the most austere environments.
While no official studies that correlate pre-Army Chaplaincy pastoral work experience with performance as an active duty Army chaplain are known to exist, it is reasonable to assume that at least in a number of cases, the more experience a minister has in helping people with vast and intense spiritual needs-like Army Soldiers have-the better able he/she is to provide for those needs. Arguably, day-to-day ministry at the battalion level may not appear to have a lot in common with the day-today ministry of most civilian clergypersons. However, the more experience would-be chaplains have at mastering the fundamental pastoral skills of practicing spiritual formation and spiritual disciplines, establishing pastoral identity, conducting religious rites, relating meaningfully to people, and helping others establish and nurture their relationship to God, the better able they will be to minister to Soldiers. Thus, reducing PWE requirements to less than two years may incur some risks that need to be considered. Lieutenant Colonel, and 50% for Colonel. 24 Because the Army Chaplain Corps manages its own personnel with regard to promotion, it is not bound by the "year group"
Increase Promotion
restrictions that the Active Competitive Category uses. As a result, the CCH has been able to adjust the number of officers being considered for promotion at each board, thereby allowing the Chaplain Corps to regulate and modify its proximity to DOPMA promotion opportunity targets throughout the implementation of DOPMA. 25 As an example of how promotion opportunity can be a means for mitigating chaplain shortages, imagine that the Army Chaplaincy is faced with a shortage of chaplains at the rank of Lieutenant Colonel (LTC). In that case, the CCH, in consultation with the Army G-1 and upon approval by the Secretary of the Army, has the authority to request that the next promotion selection board select a greater number of chaplains from the number of those Majors being considered for promotion to LTC than was previously scheduled. Rather than constraining the board to only select officers until the DOPMA recommended target of 70% is reached, the CCH can, on a board by board basis, request that the selection rate be raised to 80%, 90%, or any number above 70%, even up to 100%, if the CCH has ample justification (such as Army manning requirements) to warrant such an increase. This measure alone would temporarily yield more promotable chaplains than the normal promotion target opportunities would have yielded, who could be assigned at the next higher rank.
However, the tool of increasing promotion opportunity is not without its potentially negative side effects. When a larger than usual number of officers is promoted in a short time span, that large number creates what is sometimes called a "bubble," that is likely to cause future problems for career management. As that bubble of promoted officers becomes eligible for the next grade, unless the promotion opportunity is again increased far beyond the norm, that particular cohort of officers will experience what appears to be a heavier than usual toll in terms of non-selection for promotion. This could have a negative impact on morale, which may then increase attrition. the Chaplaincy historically has its greatest shortage of chaplains. Thus, given that the Captain rank is the most under-resourced, accelerating promotions via greater promotion opportunity may create more challenges than solutions. This is a perfect example of why chaplain personnel management requires a systems approach, in that every action on one apparently isolated part of the system affects the rest of the system.
Perhaps one of the most significant ramifications of increasing promotion opportunity is that the quality of officers selected then comes into question. If there is value in the Army's time-honored promotion system that requires selection boards to choose only the best qualified officers based on their performance records and professional files, then one must ask how much value there is in promotion operations when the selection rate nears 100% and virtually all who are considered are selected? 27 Again, common sense and experience indicate that the Army needs some form of criteria that can be used to promote the best officers, while simultaneously preventing officers who are clearly not performing from advancing too far. 28 While chaplains who are non-select for promotion can certainly continue to make valuable contributions to the Army, the Army Chaplain Corps must participate in the current Army-wide "up-or-out system," and thus must consider the quality vs. quantity argument when it comes to adjusting promotion opportunity.
A final negative effect of increasing promotion opportunity is that when there is a promotion opportunity "jump" in one single board, officers who were not selected for promotion by other boards that were more stringent could potentially feel slighted, which could then result in equal opportunity grievances being filed with the Inspector General.
An officer non-selected for promotion by boards immediately preceding or following the high-opportunity board could even file a lawsuit claiming that his/her selection board was comparatively unfair, in accordance with Department of Defense guidance 29 and
Title 10, U.S. Code. 30 These documents state that the military services will offer relatively similar promotion opportunities over any given five-year period in each grade.
Even if no official litigation or grievance is initiated, the appearance of a "favored" cohort of officers that were the beneficiaries of an abnormally high promotion opportunity board could have a considerably negative effect on morale, which could again increase attrition and worsen the shortage problem. Thus, increasing promotion opportunity, while it remains a viable tool for stabilizing the force, should be employed with great caution.
Adjust Promotion Timing. Another promotion-related tool that the CCH can use
as a ways and means to manage chaplain shortages is the adjustment of promotion timing. Promotion timing is defined as the "12-month average of the total active commissioned service for due-course officers promoted during each month of the fiscal year." 31 In other words, the promotion timing for a given cohort of Chaplains measures the average of how many years it took for clergypersons in that cohort with no prior commissioned officer experience to go from their initial date of commissioning until they pinned on the rank being measured. The DOPMA targets for promotion timing for all Army field grade officers is 10 years +/-1 year for Majors; 16 years +/-1 year for LTCs;
and 22 years +/-1 year for Colonel. 32 Historically, the CCH has been able to manage active duty chaplain promotions so that field-grade promotion timing measurements for due-course chaplains have remained fairly close to the DOPMA targets. 33 In order to relieve shortages of chaplains at any given rank, the CCH can, in consultation with the Army G-1, reduce promotion timing by granting specific cohorts of promotable officers earlier promotion dates than were previously scheduled. Typically, the list of a cohort of chaplains selected for promotion will be exhausted within the fiscal year following the release of that promotion list. The more the CCH reduces the time a chaplain waits between the date of the announcement of his/her selection for promotion and the date he/she actually pins on the rank, the more rapidly the allocations for that rank will be filled. However, rank allocations being attained more quickly than normal can again cause either the "bubble" effect or the perception of unfairness by other cohorts as mentioned above under promotion opportunity.
Another method for reducing shortages at the lower ranks of Captain and Major, strategy that helps preserve Captains in the inventory must be considered.
Increasing promotion timing has its potential negative effects, however. As with other aspects of promotion mentioned above, morale issues again come into play.
Officers, including chaplains, who have waited years for promotion and have watched others before them reach the respective higher ranks within fairly consistent and predictable time periods can become distraught if they are suddenly told that their cohort will have to wait several more months, if not a year or multiple years to reach the same ranks. Even if senior leadership tries to assure chaplains that their extra wait time to promotion is for the good of the Chaplain Corps, and is not being done with malice or because of mismanagement, but simply to help mitigate chaplain shortages due to unprojected growth, affected chaplains are likely to become somewhat discouraged. As stated previously, the impact of negative morale is the potential for greater attrition, which would again only exacerbate the original problem of chaplain shortages.
A further limit to the effectiveness of increasing promotion timing is that current Army policy mandates that promotions from a specific promotion list will begin within a period of no more than nine months after the date that list is released. 34 If promotion timing is increased too far, then there will eventually be an entire fiscal year, perhaps even multiple years, when no promotion selection board is necessary at all. This would again likely have a negative effect on morale and could possibly increase attrition.
Additionally, as pointed out earlier, Department of Defense guidance and U.S. Law indicate that a healthy, well-managed officer corps in any branch is one that is able to hold fairly predictable promotion boards on a regular, recurring basis. 35 Furthermore, an increase in promotion timing may temporarily solve a shortage problem, but at some point, if not used in moderation, it could eventually exceed DOPMA standards to the point that it jeopardized the otherwise healthy promotion pyramid of the Chaplain Branch.
Recall Retirees. Title 10, U.S. Code authorizes the Army to recall retired chaplains to active duty to serve additional years beyond their retirement date to meet the needs of the Army. 36 For each retiree recall, the CCH must request an exception to policy through the Army G-1 from the Secretary of the Army on a case by case basis.
The CCH has been using this tool in a limited way for several years, especially to meet the needs of critically short faith groups, like Roman Catholic priests. Rather than promoting chaplains to the senior ranks of Major, LTC, and Colonel, which then causes a corresponding turbulence in the ranks of LTC and Major, as well as a worsened shortage of Captains as presented above, the CCH could utilize retirement recall in a limited fashion as a ways and means of mitigating shortages at the critically-short Captain level. This would entail recalling a relatively small number of qualified field grade chaplains to fill positions as needed across the Army.
If those recalled Colonels, LTCs, and Majors are assigned to positions of one rank lower than the rank they hold, then current Army manning policy allows them not to be counted against rank-specific end strength for the purposes of promotion projection. 37 Thus, recalling a limited number of retired chaplains, for periods of two to three years, to fill critical positions at one rank below their retired rank would allow the active duty ranks to hold continued promotion selection boards, yet would help alleviate
shortages. An additional benefit of the retiree recall option for the individual chaplains concerned is that they continue to earn increased retirement salary benefits while they are being paid for full-time military service. Retirees recalled to active duty also receive all the benefits (housing, medical services, life insurance) that any non-retired, active duty chaplain receives. Furthermore, recalled retirees do not receive OERs, and do not compete for promotion, which lessens the administrative burden on both the individuals and the command to which they are assigned.
As with the other ways and means discussed above, because chaplain personnel management is a system, the retiree recall option can cause changes to the rest of the system that are not all positive. One problem with recalling retirees is that it can still create an unintended slow-down in the promotion timing (promotion rate), especially if the Army G-1 begins enforcing certain manning policies that have been somewhat relaxed during the GWOT era. In those cases, for every Colonel that is allowed to retire, then immediately re-enter active service, one less LTC is now eligible to either be selected for promotion, or if already selected, to pin on the rank of Colonel since the overall number of Chaplains in each rank has a cap mandated by law and enforced by the Army G-1. 38 There may also be a sense amongst both non-chaplain line officers and chaplains alike, that since recalled retirees do not receive official ratings, they are not as accountable to command authority as they would be or should be, if they were rated. While there is plenty of debate about how well the current OER system works, 39 this particular criticism does not appear too significant at present, but should at least be considered.
Offer Retention Bonuses. To encourage Captain chaplains to remain on active duty, especially those who would otherwise have chosen to resign due to the hardships associated with the current dynamic of multiple deployments, the CCH could seek funding for retention bonuses. In 2006, the Army G-1 requested the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) provide funding for Captains in certain year groups that
were showing critical shortage levels. 40 So far, those bonuses, which included cash, schooling options, and assignments of choice in exchange for increased service obligations, appear to have helped the Army retain some officers who would have otherwise resigned. 41 The Army Chaplaincy was not eligible for these retention bonuses, because Captain chaplain attrition rates were well below the cut-off figure of 8.5% established by the OSD. 42 Two significant facts that have previously been mentioned bear emphasis here:
for the past decade and for the projected future, the majority of the Chaplaincy force structure growth is at the Captain level, and the highest attrition rates are historically also at the Captain level. Consequently, the greatest shortage of chaplains is always felt at the Captain level, typically, at the echelon of battalion or its equivalent. A clear understanding of why certain policies are implemented would do much to reduce the challenges to morale and the other personnel turbulence that the changes may cause. It will also be more necessary than ever for the OCCH to closely monitor the second and third order effects of any newly implemented shortage mitigation tool on officer grade distribution, proximity to DOPMA targets for promotion timing and opportunity, quality of chaplains selected for promotion, and Branch morale as it affects attrition.
Whatever ways and means are used to shape the Chaplain Corps, the CCH should be wary of repeating mistakes like those made by senior service leaders during the military drawdown of the 1990s, when, as one military analyst put it, some leaders chose "policies detrimental to the long-term interest of their service, in favor of the immediate needs of current service members." 45 Perhaps the most important point to remember is that because chaplain personnel management is a human system, any
proposed method that appears to decrease chaplain shortages will need to be carefully evaluated in light of how it changes other aspects of the system as a whole.
Given the current shortage of chaplains and the potential for its continued duration over the next several years, the Army Chaplaincy cannot afford to wait too long to act, but must continue to take careful, prayerful steps to relieve that shortage, while simultaneously ensuring that the long-term health of the Chaplain Corps continues to be a high priority. In these challenging times of persistent engagement, the Army's Soldiers and Family members deserve to continue to receive the very best religious support that the Army Chaplaincy can provide. Likewise, the chaplains who serve those Soldiers and Family members deserve the highest quality personnel management and branch management that the Army can provide them. 
